Among all possible contingencies, there has been an evident progression toward the dystopian future foretold by visionary writers such as Aldous Huxley in particular. Huxley’s 1932 novel Brave New World alluded to the pre-existing epidemic that concerned the use of pharmacological neuroenhancement for improved cognitive and affective functioning (i.e., attention, memory, mood, etc.) via legal or illicit drug use [1]. But at what costs? As portrayed in the novel, the drug “soma” induces feelings of happiness while nullifying any kind of discomfort and pain [2]. Such quixotic concepts have been exploited to serve as a form of enhancement to construct the best version of our brains, especially in the postmodern era [3]. The use of pharmacological neuroenhancement, synonymously known as brain doping, by healthy subjects for non-medical purposes to enhance performance and work has been a common practice that can be traced back to the ancient Greeks who used pharmacological neuroenhancement when competing in the Olympic Games [4]. Although intense polarization has been ceaselessly ongoing between transhumanists and bioconservatives in the neuroenhancement debate.
While transhumanists argue in favor of utilizing pharmacological neuroenhancement as a form of genetic engineering to increase human cognitive abilities and thereby radically change the ways through which our species develop, bioconservatives are skeptical of such propositions and dismiss any morally permissible ideas related to modifying our natural intelligence. In their views, bioconservatives criticize the transhumanist ideal of perfection and their hubristic ambition to override the inherent principles of nature, which echoes the warning conveyed by Huxley that the perturbing influence of eugenics-inspired biotechnologies must be resisted. It is therefore imperative to critically examine and analyze the philosophical basis for both stances in relation to the ethics of using pharmacological neuroenhancement and to ultimately unveil the truth of the Huxleyan reality—a nightmarish, oppressive vision that Huxley once envisaged and feared.
In utilitarian terms, an alluring aspect as promised by the effective use of pharmacological neuroenhancement is increased cognitive functioning, which transiently improves performance in any given activity such as learning and memorization [7]. One familiar example is the use of psychostimulants like methylphenidate (brand name: Ritalin) among college and university students. Taking such neuroenhancement drugs lead to improved working memory and increased attention, which reportedly helps students study for longer hours and study more productively with reduced anxiety. Of note, however, is that the original purpose of the stimulant is meant to be prescribed to treat individuals with ADHD, [7] and not for augmenting one’s cognition for the benefit of improving the human cognitive condition [9]. All progress throughout the course of human civilization is rooted in the fundamental belief of climbing to the next step in the evolutionary hierarchy, which motivated the need to intervene and manipulate the systematic complexities of the human mind for the sake of continuing progress. In the instance of using pharmacological neuroenhancement to increase one’s cognitive abilities, an intelligence-based hierarchy as modeled after the social infrastructures that exist in the Huxleyan reality would thus be born [2]. Living under this type of hierarchy implies that even though an individual would rather prefer not to take neuroenhancement drugs, he or she would nevertheless be pressured to take the drug in an increasingly competitive environment to be on par with someone who is already conditioned to take the drug on a regular basis [5]. The aftermath would then result in the problem of, does the individual still retain his or her autonomy?
Calling transhumanism “the world’s most dangerous idea,” the political scientist Francis Fukuyama suggests that when giving in to the temptations of transhumanist thought such as in the goal of enhanced cognition, the impulse to buy into such ideas oftentimes would cause the individual to be blinded to the actual price [10]. Notwithstanding the utopian ideal, it is noteworthy to mention the health risks along with the addictive effects associated with taking neuroenhancement drugs that may pose harm to the individual, to which many of the users are oblivious [11]. By taking the use of neuroenhancement drugs out of its medical context for unintended purposes such as serving as a studying aid, the thin line that distinguishes enhancement from treatment is blurred as a result. In doing so, the individual becomes vulnerable to, among other things, increased blood pressure, nausea, and irregular palpitations from the effect of altered brain chemistry as a result of taking psychostimulants [12]. Ironically, the case of memory enhancement may also cause impairment to memory retrieval by interfering with the balance between remembering and forgetting due to information overload in the higher-order capacities of the brain [3]. Hence, while it is reasonably acceptable for individuals with mental illnesses or cognitive deficiencies to take neuroenhancement medications to reinstate normal brain functioning, the inverse is true in the case of enhancement where safety is a primary ethical concern.
A supporting argument used to oppose bioconservatism is that pharmacological neuroenhancement promotes fairness and equity, notably for individuals who may be disadvantaged in some ways when compared to others in the context of applying to schools or finding employment [13]. Interventions by unnatural, pharmacological means thus allow underperformed individuals to have improved capabilities by elevating their lower cognitive functioning to match the normal baseline functioning [5]. However, this argument fails to take into account the socio-economic barriers that influence how justly neuroenhancement drugs will be distributed among a given population [13]. Problems would arise when disparities become apparent by considering the fact that neuroenhancement drugs may not be affordable for everyone, especially for the lower classes and those without health insurance coverages. Hypothetically, even if neuroenhancement drugs were made universally accessible through public policy solutions or government mandates, ethical concerns may be raised with regard to losing one’s liberty as a direct result of being coerced into taking neuroenhancement drugs. The likely outcomes of this hypothetical scenario have already been reflected in vaccine mandates throughout the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, where some individuals expressed antagonism in response to such mandates to protect their liberty and personal choice [5]. However, in the Huxleyan reality, liberty simply does not prevail. While coercion may be justified in the context of vaccine mandates for disease prevention, this hypothetical scenario as it applies to enhancement supports the bioconservative argument by resembling the events that were detailed in Brave New World, in which the citizens of Huxley’s dystopia all became mentally compromised by virtue of taking soma as administered by the World State [2]. Hence, when the cause for coercion is unjustifiable, it becomes worthy to ponder upon the question, is there any degree of freedom to our actions when under the influence of neuroenhancement drugs?
Bioconservatives, moreover, continue to reinforce their objections to the use of pharmacological neuroenhancement with rationales that are beyond the preceding arguments related to safety and fairness, one that reveals the psychological horror of using pharmacological neuroenhancement. Imagine a baseball player taking neuroenhancement drugs such as steroids to increase their competitiveness on the playing field; as a result, ten home runs were hit in a single game. Contrast this with a baseball player who accomplished the same feat but without the use of neuroenhancement drugs; instead, it was the result of rigorous training and real effort [13]. The questions now present themselves as, which of the two players is more undeserving of his achievement and unworthy of praise? Does integrity not matter? The answers, of course, are obvious. Our intuition is capable of telling us what is morally responsible and what is not. In the case of the baseball player who used neuroenhancement drugs, the erosion of human agency rendered his achievement to become “hollowed” and his character to become morally “defective”, supplemented by the loss of personal dignity and overall humanity according to the foundational ethical framework that governs our morals and values [14]. Because at the end of the day, the credit does not go to the baseball player, but rather to the pharmacist who prescribed the drug or to the dealer who sold the drug.
The hubris objection as illustrated by the aforementioned example denounces the transhumanist methodology of undermining intrinsic values such as grit and tenacity and underappreciating our “gifted” character and powers with which we derived from nature, and further ridiculing the Promethean desire to be dominant over the natural order [15]. This objection was originally configured by political philosopher Michael Sandel and supported by physician-scientist Leon Kass. Kass added to Sandel’s argument of “giftedness” by emphasizing the dire consequences of substituting our moral virtues with pharmacological neuroenhancement-induced effects. Consider this thought experiment: If drugs that were originally meant to treat patients with PTSD become easily accessible to anyone, how many people without mental illnesses would be willing to take such drugs for the purpose of preventing bad memories from consolidating in their minds? While the feelings of trauma or sorrow from an unfortunate experience is undesirable, taking neuroenhancement drugs to block out those feelings and the associated painful memories of that experience would hinder our ability to develop the necessary mechanisms to cope with the myriad of negative feelings that are essential to our psychology [16]. In consequence, we would miss the opportunity for personal growth upon losing our self-control and fail to integrate the adversities of our lives to our character development. We no longer feel the sharpness of that feeling of pain, but do we still retain the courage to stand up and walk forward? This question often appears in the Huxleyan reality in which the character John “the Savage” is refused the right to be unhappy because unhappiness is not a realized concept [2]. When an individual wishes to take soma to relish in pleasure and escape from disillusionment, but in exchange, the individual would forever be trapped in a peaceful fantasy that juxtaposes the cruel reality, where does real happiness lie? To John, real happiness lies in enduring excruciating pain but knowing that it will all be worthwhile—like acing a test after hours spent studying or winning a game after the amount of effort that was spent during practice. Thus, it is within reason that taking shortcuts via artificial means offers no meaning in our pursuit of accomplishments—irrespective of the scale—and such conducts only pathologize our imperfections.
To live with dissonance and the unanticipated are preconditions to appreciating what life has already given us and its beauty, thus enabling us to live a flourishing life that is fulfilling without external interventions that could potentially disfigure the relationship that we have with ourselves and restrict our exercise of freedom. In reference to the words of John who chose to be unhappy, we can cherish the notion that unhappiness is bliss, for it ensures that we still preserve our individual identities and the autonomy to taste the flavors of life: “I don't want comfort. I want God, I want poetry, I want real danger, I want freedom, I want goodness. I want sin” [2]. While the endeavor to advance the evolution of human cognition is appealing, one must be cautious of the dubious means represented by the unnaturalness of pharmacological neuroenhancement, as it is irresponsible to toy with our very own subjective experiences and personality traits in the midst of ambiguities [3]. Let it be known that the aspiration to enhance our cognition may lead to the inability to achieve a complete understanding of ourselves and ultimately to the downfall of our own humanity; even more so, it is at odds with our inalienable human rights in which the happiness that we would find from pharmacological neuroenhancement is only illusionary under this fallacy. The Huxleyan reality of using pharmacological neuroenhancement is not an inevitable future, and can be averted if we first consider the question: What am I willing to lose?
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